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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

:

Case No. 960203-CA

:
Priority No. 15

ANGELO GIRON,

:

Defendant-Appellee.

OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff State of Utah appeals a final order of dismissal, entered by the
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable William B. Bohling,
presiding, in a prosecution for unlawful possession of a controlled substance (cocaine).
Dismissal was ordered following the trial court's order suppressing evidence, which order
rendered the prosecution unable to proceed. See State v. Troyer, 866 P.2d 528 (Utah
1993). This State's appeal is taken pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2)(a) (Supp.
1995), as construed in Troyer. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995).

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL,
ISSUE PRESERVATION,
AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Did the trial court erroneously conclude that the search of Giron's
automobile, made upon Giron's arrest but after he was handcuffed and seated in a police
cruiser, was not justified as a search incident to arrest?
2. Did the trial court erroneously conclude that officers who arrested Giron
could not impound his automobile due to the proximity of Giron's automobile to his
residence at the time of the arrest and impoundment?
3. Did the trial court erroneously conclude that the "inventory search" of
Giron's automobile was an improper "pretext" search?
Each issue was preserved by the Supplement to State's Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress (R. 64-67), and by the trial court's rulings
on the merits (R. 95) (see also Point I-A of this brief). A "bifurcated" review standard
applies for each issue: Underlying fact findings are reviewed deferentially, and reversed
only for "clear error." The court's conclusions of law, however, are reviewed for
correctness. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994); State v. Thurman, 846
P.2d 1256,1265-71 (Utah 1993).
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
This case involves the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
which states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant Angelo Giron was charged with unlawful possession of a
controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree felony (R. 8). The physical evidence
supporting the charge includes cocaine powder and drug paraphernalia (syringes and
spoons) (R. 8-9). Giron moved to suppress that evidence, contending that police had
seized it during an illegal search of his automobile (R. 45-46, 53-61). After an
evidentiary hearing, review of the parties' memoranda, and argument, the trial court
entered Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, granting the motion to
suppress (R. 92-96).
Owing to the State's inability to proceed without the suppressed evidence,
the case was dismissed with prejudice (R. 109-10,112-13). The State appealed, filed its
docketing statement, and moved for summary reversal, arguing that the trial court had
erroneously rejected the State's contention that the search of Giron's automobile was
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proper incident to his arrest (Sum. Reversal Motion, No. 960203-CA,filed4/10/96).
After review of Giron's memorandum in opposition, this Court denied the summary
reversal motion, reserving all issues for plenary review (Order filed 5/28/96).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Original Stop
On 22 January 1995, Officers Bench and Ruth were motor patrolling the
West side of Salt Lake City (Tr. 9/18/95 at 4-5). Officer Bench saw an automobile make
an improper U-tum, and therefore signalled the automobile to stop; it promptly did so (id.
at 5, 30). Bench approached defendant Giron, who was the driver, and asked for his
driver's license; instead, Giron produced a Utah identification card (id. at 6). Meanwhile,
Giron's passenger exited from the automobile and started to walk away, discarding what
appeared to be narcotics (id. at 6-7). Officer Ruth attempted to apprehend the passenger,
who ran away (id. at 7). Bench directed Giron to wait while he assisted Officer Ruth
(id.). Instead of waiting, Giron drove off, squealing his tires as he departed (id. at 8).
It took some time for the officers to complete the arrest and booking of
Giron's passenger. They then attempted to locate Giron. From his identification card, the
officers conducted a record check which revealed that Giron's driver's license was
suspended or expired; they also learned his address (id. at 8-9). Approximately three
hours after the original stop, the officers went to Giron's address. They did not find
anybody at the residence (id. at 9,37).
4

The Second Stop, Arrest, & Search
Shortly after leaving Giron's residence, the officers saw him driving the
same automobile as before, but accompanied by a different passenger. They again
signalled Giron to stop, using lights and siren (id. at 10, 33). This time, Giron did not
promptly stop; instead, he drove on for roughly a city block, making two turns before
finally stopping across the street from his residence (id. at 10, 33-34, 36).
Officer Bench arrested Giron for failing to obey his order to remain at the
scene of the original stop (id. at 10-11, 34). He handcuffed Giron and placed him in the
police cruiser (id. at 11, 34-35). The officers impounded Giron's automobile, which was
properly registered to Giron (id. at 35). They began an inventory search of the
automobile, recovering suspected illegal substances (tested and found to be cocaine) and
paraphernalia including scales, syringes, spoons, and baggies (id. at 12-14,41). Another
officer was summoned to complete the inventory and to await the tow truck, while
Officers Bench and Ruth drove Giron to jail (id. at 14-15, 37-38).
The Suppression Motion
In the trial court, Giron moved to suppress the contraband, arguing that the
officers had no authority to impound his automobile, and that the inventory search "was a
mere pretext for an investigatory search" (Mem. in Support of Mot. to Suppress, R. 53-61
(copied in appendix I of this brief)). In its initial memorandum in opposition, the State
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argued that the impoundment and inventory search were valid (this memorandum never
was placed in the trial court record, but was acknowledged by Giron's counsel (R. 208)).
An evidentiary hearing was held on the motion (R. 121-79). The State
introduced copies of the written Salt Lake Police impound/inventory policy and the
written inventory of Giron's automobile to document compliance with the policy (R. 16263, 168-69 (admission of State's exhs. 1 & 2, copied in appendix II)). Under direct and
cross examination, Officer Bench explained that under the Salt Lake policy, the decision
whether to impound an arrestee's car is discretionary with the arresting officer (R. 15666). The policy does not require officers to seek alternatives to impoundment (R. 163).
In this case, Officer Bench explained, he impounded Giron's automobile due to "Driver
arrest, no driver license, nobody to turn the vehicle over to" (R. 132).
Officer Bench stated that to his best-admittedly poor-recollection, Giron's
passenger (at the second stop) had not been asked to take custody of Giron's automobile
because the passenger did not have a driver's license with him (R. 155-56). Officer
Bench also explained that he and Officer Ruth did not re-check Giron's residence to see if
anybody there could take the vehicle, because they had just been at the residence and had
found nobody home (R. 156-57). Nor was Giron's mother (who apparently lived with
Giron) asked to care for the automobile. She had appeared at the arrest scene, but not
until after the contraband had already been recovered (R. 160).

6

Besides arguing that Giron's automobile was validly impounded and
inventoried, the State argued that the search of Giron's vehicle was proper incident to his
lawful arrest. The State had not raised this argument in its original memorandum in
opposition to suppression. However, in a supplemental memorandum filed after the
evidentiary hearing, but before argument on the motion about six weeks later, the State
argued, in the alternative, that Giron's automobile had been properly searched incident to
his arrest (Supp. to State's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Suppress, R. 66-67
(filed 10/23/95) (copied in appendix I)).
The State pursued the "search incident to arrest" theory at oral argument on
the motion to suppress (R. 193-96). Through counsel, Giron argued that the evidence did
not support that theory (R. 207-09). ] In particular, Giron noted that at the time of the

^-Giron's counsel alluded to waiver, but did not assert it against the State:
At the time the [police] report's filed it's clear that he is
characterizing it as an inventory. Indeed the state filed a memorandum in
this case early on. As soon as I filed a motion to suppress, they filed a
memorandum, no mention whatsoever of search incident to arrest.
We do a hearing and at the hearing no one argues, no one asks
questions in regards to search incident to arrest. Now, we don't have
pleading rules like civil lawyers do, but we do have burdens of proof and
it's clear in this case that it is the burden of the state to provide some
exception to the per se unreasonableness of a warrantless search. They
presented no testimony whatsoever, and for the very first time was when
the state filed their responsive memorandum they indicated that becauseinventory obviously wouldn't work—that they were now going to rely on
search incident to arrest. I don't think there's any way they can establish
that, particularly given the fact that no evidence was adduced in that
regard.
(R. 207-08).
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search, he was handcuffed and seated in the police cruiser, with no realistic prospect of
reaching into his own automobile (R. 209-12).
The trial court granted the motion to suppress, rejecting both the "inventory
search" and the "search incident to arrest" arguments advanced by the State (R. 216-17).
The parties each proffered findings of fact and conclusions of law; at one point the State
moved, unsuccessfully, for reconsideration of the trial court's ruling (R. 71-89). In its
final, Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court ruled as follows:
1. That as a result [of] the Defendant's vehicle being parked
directly across [the street]fromhis residence, impoundment was
neither authorized nor necessary.
2. Even assuming arguendo the impound was justified, the
"inventory" search was merely a pretext for an investigatory search
for evidence.
3. That at the time of the search the Defendant had been
secured and removed from the area, that there was no physical or
temporal proximity to the arrest, and no basis to justify the search of
Defendant's vehicle as a search incident to his arrest.
(R. 95, copied in appendix III). Because the suppression order made it impossible for the
prosecution to proceed, the trial court dismissed the case with prejudice, as provided in
State v. Troyer, 866 P.2d 528 (Utah 1993) (R. 109, 112). The State itfw appeals.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. The trial court erroneously ruled that Giron's automobile could not be
lawfully searched incident to his arrest. Giron was handcuffed and seated in the police
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cruiser when the search was conducted; however, these facts do not support the trial
court's ruling. To the contrary, settled law-most particularly the United States Supreme
Court's Belton decision and this Court's Moreno decision-permits a search incident to
arrest even under these facts. The trial court erred by disregarding this law.
2. The trial court also erred in concluding that Giron's automobile could
not validly be impounded because it was parked across the street from his home when he
was arrested. Fourth Amendment law, stated in the United States Supreme Court's
Bertine decision, imposes no such limitation on police prerogative to impound a vehicle.
Instead, impoundment is justified so long as it is supported by some reason other than a
criminal investigation. In this case, such reason existed because Giron's had no driver's
license, and the police impoundment policy permits impoundment to prevent law
violations. Impoundment of Giron's automobile helped to assure that he would not
continue to unlawfully without a license, and was therefore proper.
3. Finally, the trial court erroneously condemned the post-impoundment
inventory search of Giron's automobile as "pretextual." "Pretext" analysis has been
eliminated from the analysis of both temporary detentions and full arrests of persons,
under the Utah Supreme Court's Lopez and Harmon decisions. It is therefore
incongruous and inappropriate to apply "pretext" analysis to the search of an impounded
automobile, because such search does not invade liberty to nearly the same extent as an
arrest. The trial court also committed clear error byfindingthat the inventory search was
9

not conducted in conformity with the applicable police policy. The unrebutted evidence
showed that a written policy existed, and was followed in this case. Therefore, the
inventory search of Giron's automobile was valid.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED
THAT GIRON'S AUTOMOBILE COULD NOT BE
SEARCHED INCIDENT TO HIS ARREST
The most immediate and appropriate basis for reversal of the trial court's
judgment lies in its conclusion that Giron's automobile could not, without a warrant, be
searched incident to his arrest (R. 95). True, Giron had been handcuffed and placed in the
police cruiser at the time of the search; therefore, as a literal matter, he could not reach
into his automobile to grab a weapon or destroy evidence. However, these facts do not
support the trial court's conclusion that the search of Giron's automobile was not justified
as a "search incident to arrest"—a settled exception to the warrant requirement.
A.

This Issue is Preserved for Appellate Review.
Opposing the State's summary reversal motion on this point, Giron argued

that the State waived its "search incident to arrest" argument by failing to present it in
timely fashion to the trial court (Mem. in Opp. to Sum. Reversal, No. 960203-CA at 2
n.l, 9). The argument is not waived. Although raised for the first time in its
supplemental memorandum filed after the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress,
10

the State's "incident to arrest" argument was properly presented to the trial court. The
trial court granted specific leave for both parties to file memoranda at the conclusion of
the evidentiary hearing on 18 September 1995 (R. 177-78). Hence Giron's memorandum
supporting suppression was filed on 13 October (R. 53), and the State's supplemental
memorandum in opposition, presenting the "incident to arrest" argument, was filed on 23
October (R. 62, copied in appendix I).
Argument on the motion was held on 30 October 1995 (R. 180-220).
Rather than arguing that the State had waived the "incident to arrest" argument, Giron
argued that the facts did not support it-that is, he opposed the argument on the merits (R.
208-12; see also pp. 7-8 n.2 of this brief). Finally, the trial court's rejection of the
"incident to arrest" argument was not based upon waiver, but rested exclusively on the
merits: "[A]t the time of the search the Defendant had been secured and removed from
the area, [so that] that there was no physical or temporal proximity to the arrest..." (R.
95). Thus besides being timely raised, the trial court's ruling on the merits preserved the
"search incident to arrest" issue for appellate review. See State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d
1150,1161 (Utah 1991) (when trial court addresses merits of issue raised for first time in
new trial motion, prior waiver is excused).
B.

Under Settled Law, the Search was Proper Incident to Arrest
On the merits, the search of Giron's automobile was proper incident to his

arrest. The law on this point is settled and straightforward, and has been consistently
11

applied in Utah. Accordingly, there is no "measure of deference," State v. Pena, 869 P.2d
932, 935-40 (Utah 1994), to be granted to the trial court's judgment.
The pertinent, uncontested facts are as follows: Officer Bench arrested
Giron for failing to obey his order to remain at the scene of the original stop. He assisted
Giron out of his automobile, handcuffed Giron, and placed him in the police cruiser (R.
130-31,154-55). Officer Bench then searched the interior of Giron's automobile,
recovering contraband from the passenger area (under and between the driver and front
passenger seats, and on the back seat) (R. 132-34,159).
A key fact finding underpinning the trial court's rejection of the State's
"search incident to arrest" argument reads: "At the time Officer Bench searched Mr.
Giron's car, any possibility of Mr. Giron gaining access to the car for purposes of
recovering a weapon, or concealing or destroying evidence had been completely
eliminated by the arrest, handcuffing, and the removal of the Defendant from the area of
the vehicle" (R. 94). Although correct, that finding, as a matter of law, does not support
the conclusion that the search was improper. Under settled Fourth Amendment law, a
search of the passenger area of an arrestee's automobile is proper, even after police have
rendered the arrestee unable to actually reach into the automobile. See New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454,461 (1981) (reversing suppression order; search incident to arrest
was proper even though arrestees were moved away from the vehicle); State v. Kent, 665
P.2d 1317,1381 (Utah 1983) (search was proper even though arrestee was handcuffed
12

and lying on ground next to vehicle); State in re K.K.C., 636 P.2d 1044,1046 (Utah 1981)
(per curiam) (search proper even though arrestee removed from vehicle). See also Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), and State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 784 (Utah App.),
cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991) (both discussing extent of permissible search
incident to arrest).
This conclusion is reinforced by this Court's decision in State v. Moreno,
910 P.2d 1245 (Utah App.), cert denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996). In Moreno, this
Court upheld a warrantless search of the defendant's automobile, conducted after the
defendant's arrest and after the defendant had been handcuffed and placed into a patrol
car. 910 P.2d at 1246. That is, the Court upheld a search conducted under circumstances
that were virtually identical to the pertinent facts of this case.
In upholding the Moreno search, this Court reviewed the above-cited
"search incident to arrest" cases, cases from other states and the federal courts of appeals,
and the preeminent treatise on Fourth Amendment law, Wayne R. LaFave, Search and
Seizure (3rd ed. 1996). Quoting Professor LaFave's analysis of Belton, the leading case,
this Court observed: "[U]nder Belton a search of the vehicle is allowed even after the
defendant was removed from it, handcuffed, and placed in the squad car, or even if a
single defendant was in custody of several officers." Moreno, 910 P.2d at 1248 (quoting
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.1(c) at 448-49). Accordingly, this Court held that the
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search of defendant Moreno's vehicle 'Svas clearly proper as a search incident to a lawful
arrest." Id. at 1247 (emphasis added).
Because the search in Moreno was "clearly proper," the search in this case
also was clearly proper. As explained in Moreno and its underpinning authority, it does
not matter that the arrestee is unable to reach into his automobile when the search is
conducted. The scope of a permissible search incident to arrest is not so tightly confined;
instead, such search may include "the interior of a recently occupied automobile."
Moreno, 910 P.2d at 2864 (citing Belton, 453 U.S. at 460). And the search in Moreno
was proper under settled law that the State cited in this case, particularly Belton (R. 67),
opposing Giron's motion to suppress.2
The trial court's ruling in this case is also out of line with State v. Anderson,
910 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1996), and with State v. Strickling, 844 P.2d 979 (Utah App. 1992).
Anderson involved the arrest of a suspected drug trafficker, stopped by police on the open
highway. The defendant and his passenger were ordered to lie down outside their
automobile, and handcuffed; officers then searched their automobile. 910 P.2d at 1231.
The supreme court upheld that search, finding that probable cause and "exigent
circumstances" justified it. Id. at 1237. Strickling involved a search under an
automobile's seat following a valid stop, the arrival of backup officers, and removal of

2

The State provided a copy of Moreno, then just issued, to the trial court with a "Request
for Disposition" filed after the court entered its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law (R. 99-107).
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the automobile's occupants. 844 P.2d at 982. This Court upheld that search under
"weapons search" case law. Id. at 983-85. Although resting on grounds other than
"search incident to arrest," the facts underpinning Anderson and Strickling--a valid arrest
or detention and the literal inability of the detainees to reach into their automobile-are
consistent with the Belton case line relied upon by the State in this case.
Belton was written to institute a straightforward rule governing search
incident to arrest. Application of this rule, in turn, was intended to promote consistent
results in motions to suppress evidence. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 459-60. See also Pena,
869 P.2d at 936 (appellate court has duty to "say what the law is and to ensure that it is
uniform throughout the jurisdiction"); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256,1271 (Utah
1993) (appellate review fosters consistent "courtroom to courtroom" results); accord
Ornelas v. United States,

U.S.

, 116 S. Ct. 1657,1662-63 (1996). The trial

court's suppression order in this case, inconsistent with the Belton case line, gave rise to
an inconsistent, legally unsupportable result. This Court should reverse the trial court's
order of suppression, and the dismissal order that followed.
POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT
GIRON'S AUTOMOBILE COULD NOT BE IMPOUNDED
As explained in Point One, the trial court erroneously rejected the State's
argument that Giron's automobile was properly searched incident to his arrest; on that
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basis alone, this Court should reverse. However, the trial court also erroneously held
"that as a result [of] the Defendant's vehicle being parked directly across [the street] from
his residence, impoundment was neither authorized nor necessary" (R. 95).
A.

The Impoundment Was Proper under Police Department Policy.
The trial court's holding was based upon its finding that "[t]here was no

attempt to involve Mr. Giron, his passenger, or others at Mr. Giron's residence in the
decisions of impound" (R. 96,finding9(d)). That finding is correct. Again, however, it
does not support the court's conclusion that impoundment was unnecessary.
The United States Supreme Court has held that police officers legitimately
have discretion to impound an arrestee's vehicle, "so long as discretion is exercised
according to standard criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of
criminal activity." Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375 (1987); State v. Aderholt, 545
N.W.2d 559, 564 (Iowa 1996). That discretion is not related to the proximity of an
arrestee's automobile to his or her residence. In this case, discretion to impound is guided
by the following criteria in the Salt Lake Police impoundment policy:
Officers of this department may impound vehicles as a means of
enforcing local and state laws, removing a public hazard or nuisance,
securing evidence, or protecting the vehicle and its contents until the
owner can take possession of if [sic: it].
(Ref: Title 41, Chapter 6, UCA)
To avoid needless expense and inconvenience to the vehicle owner,
officers shall use discretion in determining whether or not a vehicle
should be impounded.
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(State's exh. 1, § 4-08-16.01 (parenthetical citation in original), copied in appendix II).
Asked why he impounded Giron's automobile, Officer Bench explained: "Driver arrest,
no driver license, nobody to turn the vehicle over to" (R. 132). That explanation was
consistent with the above-quoted policy, permitting impoundment "as a means of
enforcing local and state laws." The prosecutor also argued that Giron's lack of a driver's
license justified impoundment (R. 188). Driving on suspension is a crime, Utah Code
Ann. § 53-3-227 (Supp. 1995). Further, impoundment of a vehicle driven by an
unlicensed driver is supported by State v. Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272,444 P.2d 517, 519
(1968) (vehicle also did not belong to the defendant). By impounding Giron's
automobile, Officer Bench sought to prevent Giron from unlawfully driving it.
Therefore, the impoundment was proper.
B.

The Fourth Amendment Does Not Require Inquiry into
Alternative Disposition of an Arrestee's Automobile.
To the extent that State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985), suggests a

different result, such suggestion is the product of dictum that conflicts with the United
States Supreme Court's subsequent holding in Bertine (1987). In Hygh, the impoundment
and inventory search of an arrestee's automobile were deemed improper for two reasons:
first, the police did not give the arrestee any "opportunity to arrange for disposition of his
own car"; second, the officers did not ask the arrestee "if anything of value was in the
vehicle or tell [him] of the steps being taken to safeguard his property." 711 P.2d at 269.
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The latter inquiry was required under the police department's written policy. See id.
Thus the search was improper under the "policy compliance" standard of South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 378-81 (1976). Hygh, 711 P.2d at 270.
However, the court in Hygh also intimated that police are constitutionally
required to seek alternative disposition of an arrestee's vehicle before they may impound
it; in other words, that police must show the "necessity" of impoundment. 711 P.2d at
268. That intimation arosefromthe fact that under the police policy in question, the
"alternative disposition" inquiry for the vehicle was optional: it stated that a vehicle "may
be released at the scene" to another person. 711 P.2d at 268 (emphasis added). Only the
"anything of value" inquiry, directed toward the vehicle's contents, was required under
the policy. See id. at 269. However, by its discussion of the impounding officers' failure
to undertake the "alternative vehicle disposition" inquiry, the court suggested that such
inquiry is not optional, but is constitutionally required.
Because the inventory search in Hygh was improper solely because of the
officers' failure to obey the policy governing disposition of the vehicle's contents, the
Hygh court's condemnation of the vehicle impoundment was dictum: that is, the same end
result would have been reached had the question of impoundment not been discussed at
all. More critically, that dictum has been repudiated by Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375-76,
holding that as a matter of Fourth Amendment law, officers need not inquire into
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alternative disposition of an arrestee's vehicle; there need only be some legitimate,
noninvestigatory purpose for the impoundment.
While courts in other jurisdictions have sometimes held that police must
exhaust alternative dispositions for an arrestee's automobile, such decisions, like Hygh,
generally predate Bertine. See, e.g., State v. McDaniel, 156 NJ. Super. 347,354-55,383
A.2d 1174 (1978); 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.3(c) at 520 n.55 (citing
cases) (3rd ed. 1996). Indeed, the Iowa Supreme Court, in light of Bertine, has repudiated
its pre-Bertine cases holding that police must show "reasonable necessity" for
impoundment. See Aderholt, 545 N.W.2d at 564. In this case, officers Bench and Ruth
had a legitimate, police policy-supported reason to impound Giron's automobile-to stop
him from driving without a valid driver's license.3 Therefore, under current Fourth
Amendment law, stated in Bertine, the impoundment was proper.

3

In another prc-Bertine case, State v. Rice, 111 P.2d 695 (Utah 1986) (per curiam), the
Utah Supreme Court ordered suppression in an inventory search case because the police officers
in question had no written policy governing such searches, because the State conceded that
officers lacked authority to impound the vehicle, and because '"the impoundment and search were
admittedly a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive." 717 P.2d at 696-97. The
absence of standard policy, by itself, invalidated the impoundment and search in Rice; the State's
concession and the "pretext" conclusion (the latter based upon now-repudiated analysis)
amounted to dictum.
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POINT THREE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONDEMNED
THE INVENTORY SEARCH AS AN IMPROPER
"PRETEXT' SEARCH
Again, this Court should reverse for the reasons set forth in Point One of
this brief. However, the trial court also erroneously ruled that the inventory search of
Giron's automobile, following its impoundment, "was merely a pretext for an
investigatory search for evidence" (R. 95), because "the search was conducted for an
investigatory purpose" (R. 94). That ruling rests upon an unsupportable legal theory and
upon clearly erroneous fact findings.
A.

"Pretext Inventory" Analysis is Legally Unsupportable.
The Utah Supreme Court has rejected "pretext" analysis of both roadside

detentions, State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994), and of warrantless arrests, State v.
Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995). In Whren v. United States,

U.S.

, 116 S.

Ct. 1769 (1996), the United States Supreme Court followed suit with respect to roadside
detentions, yet left open the possibility that automobile inventory searches, following
impoundment, might be deemed unconstitutionally "pretextual." 116 S. Ct. at 1773,
1774. That possibility was evidently left open because of dictum in Colorado v. Bertine,
479 U.S. 367 (1987), and Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990) (both discussed in Whren,
116S.Ct.atl773).
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However, the possibility of a "pretext inventory analysis" is distinctly out of
step with all of the Supreme Court's other Fourth Amendment law, canvassed in Whren,
116 S. Ct. at 1774, holding that objective actions, rather than "ulterior motives," are at
issue in determining whether police action is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
For the same reasons set forth in Whren and in the Utah Supreme Court's Lopez decision,
873 P.2d at 1135-38, there is no sound reason (under the federal or state constitution) to
invalidate an automobile inventory search merely because the officer conducting the
search harbored an "ulterior motive" to uncover evidence of a crime.
Further, in Harmon, the Utah Supreme Court rejected "pretext" doctrine as
applied to full custodial arrests, again explaining that officer "motivation" has no place in
the question whether an arrest is valid. 910 P.2d at 1204-06. It would be incongruous to
hold that an inventory search of an automobile, which is a far less dramatic intrusion on
personal liberty than a custodial arrest, can be deemed unconstitutionally "pretextual"
simply because the searching officer was motivated by the desire to find contraband. The
trial court's ruling in this case is similarly incongruous, extending "pretext" doctrine to an
automobile search, when no such protection extends to an arrest.
In short, no "pretext inventory search" analysis should apply. To the
contrary, sound law holds that so long as an inventory search is conducted in compliance
with standardized policy, it is proper under the Fourth Amendment. See South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 378-81 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); State v. Strickling, 844
21

P.2d 979,987-89 (Utah App. 1992). Compliance with policy, not officer motivation, is
the deciding factor.
B.

The Inventory Search Complied with Standard Procedure.
In this case, the inventory search of Giron's automobile was begun by the

arresting officer, Bench, and completed by Officer Russell, summoned by Officer Bench
(R. 132,135, 168). The trial court found that the inventory search was not conducted in
compliance with standard police procedure:
9. The reported inventory search conducted when [sic: by]
Officer Bench in this case was carried out in a manner contrary to
established Salt Lake City Police Procedures for an inventory search
in the following particulars:
(a) Inventory forms were not used.
(b) No written list of items found was made.
(c) There was no attempt to contemporaneously record what
was found where.
(R. 94, copied in appendix III).4
The foregoing findings are clearly erroneous. As demonstrated by State's
exhibit 2 (copied in appendix II of this brief), Officer Russell did complete a standard
impoundment and inventory form, documenting the items that he found in Giron's
automobile. Officer Russell did complete that documentation contemporaneously to the
actual search: he explained, at the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress, that he
4

Finding 9(d) states: "There was no attempt to involve Mr. Giron, his passenger, or others
at Mr. Giron's residence in the decisions of impound" (R. 94). This finding is not relevant to the
inventory search, although it is relevant to the question whether the officers properly impounded
the automobile. Accordingly, finding 9(d) was addressed in Point Two (page 16) of this brief.
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was required to complete the inventory form before turning the automobile over to the
towing company (R. 172).
And nothing in the Salt Lake Police impoundment policy (State's exh. 1,
appendix II), prohibits the inventory duties from being divided between two officers, as
happened in this case. Cf Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367,368-69 (1987) (after
defendant was taken into custody, but before tow truck arrived, backup officer conducted
inventory of defendant's vehicle; search was held valid). Between them, Officers Bench
and Russell conducted the inventory search in accord with the impoundment policy.
Officer Bench searched the "front, back, and trunk" of the Giron's automobile before
turning the task over to Officer Russell (R. 159-60). He found a blanket in the trunk,
which he released to Giron's mother (R. 161). Bench told Officer Russell what he had
found in the automobile, assisting Russell to properly complete the written inventory
form(R. 161, 168).
Although not stated in the written impoundment policy and form, Officer
Russell explained that any contraband found in the automobile would be removed and
delivered to a criminal investigator-in this case, Officer Bench (R. 171). Because Officer
Bench had already removed contraband from the automobile when Officer Russell
arrived, and because the inventory form only records items that were found and left in the
automobile (R. 171), the contraband seized from Giron's automobile (like the blanket
turned over to Giron's mother) was not listed on the inventory form.
23

In short, the inventory search was conducted in conformity with Salt Lake
Police procedures. Accordingly, under Strickling and its underpinning authority, 844
P.2d at 988-90, the inventory search was proper. Should it be necessary to address this
point, the trial court's contrary judgment should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
As set forth in Point One of this brief, this Court should REVERSE the trial
court's ruling, and hold that the search of Giron's automobile was proper incident to his
arrest. Alternatively, reversal is supported for the reasons explained in Points Two and
Three. Contraband was lawfully seized from Giron's automobile, and therefore is
admissible at his trial. The trial court's suppression order and its order of dismissal
should be reversed, and this matter remanded to the trial court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this $%_ day of October, 1996.
JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General

J. KEVIN MURPHY
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing Opening Brief of
Appellant was hand delivered to LINDA M. JONES of Salt Lake Legal Defender
Association, attorney for defendant-appellee, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84111, this 0% day of October, 1996.
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANTS MOTION
TO SUPPRESS
Case No. 951900702FS
Judge Bohling

]
INTRODUCTION

Defendant Angelo R. Giron submits the following memorandum of points and
authorities in support of his motion to suppress evidence seized during an unlawful
search of his automobile. Salt Lake City Police Officer D. Bench ("Officer Bench")
arrested Giron on January 22,1995 for failing to obey a police officer and failure to
signal. After Giron was taken into custody, Officer Bench began to search Giron's
automobfle to "inventory" the contents of the car so it could be impounded. Narcotics
and drug paraphernalia were found in the car.

000053

To justify this type of warrantless search, the state must show that the
impoundment was lawful and that the inventory search was proper and not a mere
pretext for an investigatory search. Under Utah law, the impoundment and search of
Giron's car were illegal. Therefore, Giron asks this court to suppress the evidence found
by Officer Bench.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 22,1995, Salt Lake City police Officer's Bench and Ruth observed
Giron and passenger Zaragoza ("Zaragoza") driving Giron's automobile at approximately
8:00 p.m. They saw Giron make a U-turn and pull to the curb. According to the
officers, Giron did not signal his intentions to turn.
The officers pulled behind Giron's car and activated the emergency lights on top
of their unmarked police car. Officer Bench approached Giron on the driver's side and
Officer Ruth approached Zaragoza. Zaragoza quickly exited the vehicle, allegedly
discarded narcotics, and ran away from Officer Ruth.
Officer Ruth caught up to Zaragoza and a struggle followed. When Officer
Bench saw that Officer Ruth needed assistance he turned to Giron as he was running
away and told Giron to stay in his vehicle and wait for his return. After Officer Bench
left, Giron drove away.
After the situation with Zaragoza had been resolved, the officers went to Giron's
home at 600 West 375 North, Salt Lake City, Utah. They had obtained the address from
Giron's identification. No one appeared to be home.
After leaving Giron's residence, they saw Giron drive past them. The officers
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followed Giron and initiated their lights and siren, Giron pulled to the curb at
approximately 610 West 400 North, Salt Lake City, Utah. Officer Bench approached
Giron and told him to exit the vehicle. Giron was immediately taken into custody.
Officer Bench began a search of the vehicle. During the search, the officer
located narcotics and drug paraphernalia. Officer Bench did not complete a department
inventory form and stopped his search after locating the narcotics and paraphernalia. He
used no formalized inventory procedure when searching.
Giron's mother came out of their home which was located at 600 West, 375
North, Salt Lake City, Utah. She complained that the officers were picking on Giron
because of his drug problem.
Officer Bench took the evidence seized from the vehicle and field tested the
substance found. It tested positive for cocaine. Giron was taken to the Salt Lake
County jail on charges of possession of a controlled substance, failure to obey the lawful
order of a police officer, and failure to signal.
Another officer on the scene, Officer Russell, filled out the impound form for
Officer Bench. The car was impounded pending the forfeiture process.
ARGUMENT
I.

EVIDENCE FOUND IN A WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF GIROhPS
CAR MUST BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THERfe WAS NO BASIS
FOR THE IMPOUNDMENT OF GIROhTS CAR.

The narcotics evidence must be suppressed because the search that produced the
evidence was unlawful. To justify a warrantless search, the state must first show that the
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impound was lawful. State v. Hvgh. 711 P*2d 264, 268 (Utah 1985)(holding that
inventory search of vehicle was not proper because it was pretextual and not conducted
according to proper procedures).
The Salt Lake Police Department has established regulations which establish when
an officer may impound a vehicle. Officers may impound a vehicle to enforce state and
local laws, to protect public safety, to secure evidence or to protect the car until the
owner can take possession. Salt Lake City, UT., Police Department Guidelines § 4-0816.01. (1991).
With regard to the first basis for impoundment, Utah state law provides a
number of instances where the impound of a vehicle is part of the enforcement of a
specific law. For example, vehicles may be impounded by a police department when the
car is improperly registered or stolen, Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-115 (1953); if the
automobile is used to transport controlled substances, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13
(1953); or if the vehicle is abandoned, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-116.10 (1953). There is
no explicit statutory authority for a police officer to impound the vehicle of someone who
has been arrested for a violation like failure to obey or failure to signal.
It would also have been proper to impound Giron's car if it was necessary to
secure evidence. This basis would apply if the officers had some reason to believe that
the vehicle was involved in the commission of a crime. See, e.g.. State v. Young, 204
S.E.2d 556 (1974)(police arresting a defendant for a brutal murder discover blood on his
car and had reason to believe the car was involved in the crime). There is no indication
from the facts in Giron's case that the police officer's impounded the car because there
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was reason to believe it had been involved in a crime.
The public safety rationale for impoundment would require that the car being left
on the street would cause potential danger to the public. This could include a car that
was parked on the side of the highway, e ^ United States v. t>riffmT 729 F.2d 475 (7th
Or. 1984), or a vehicle that was inoperable and in the middle of the road, &&, People v.
Clark. 32 111App.3d 898, 336 N.E.2d 892 (1975), affd, 65 H1.2d 169, 357 N £ 2 d 798
(1976). There is no indication that Giron's car would have posed any possible threat to
public safety. He was parked on the legally on the side of the road in a residential
neighborhood.
The fourth basis for impoundment by Salt Lake City police officer's is to secure
the defendant's property while they are under arrest. Generally, courts have held that if
an arrested party is away from home, the police have the authority to impound their
personal effects, including their automobile. Cabbler v. Superintendent 528 F.2d 1142
(4th Cir. 1975). However, the requirement that the arrested party be "away from home"
has been central to a number of cases that have rejected an impoundment when the
defendant was arrested near their residence. See, e.g.. United States v. Squires. 456 F.2d
967 (2d Cir. 1972)(it was unnecessary for police to impound vehicle parked behind
residence of arrestee); State v. Simpson. 95 Wash.2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980)(when
defendant arrested at home, impoundment of truck parked in front pf his residence
illegal). See generally 2 Wayne r. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth
Amendment § 73(c), at 85-86 (2d ed. 1987).
In Giron's case, there was no need to impound his vehicle to protect his property.
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The automobile was parked at 610 West 400 North. His home is located at 600 West,
375 North, Salt Lake City, Utah. Giron was so close to his own home that his mother
could see the arrest take place from their home and came out to speak to the officers.
There is no evidence that was obstructing traffic or was in any danger of being damaged.

In sum, the impoundment of Giron's vehicle by the Salt Lake Police Department
was improper. Under the Salt Lake Police Departments own Guidelines, there was no
need to impound Giron's vehicle to enforce a state or local law, to protect public safety,
to secure evidence, or to protect the defendant's property. Therefore, the search that
Officer Bench undertook to "inventory" the car was improper and the fruits of that
search should be suppressed as evidence in this case.

II.

THE EVIDENCE SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THE
INVENTORY WAS MERELY A PRETEXT FOR AN
INVESTIGATORY SEARCH.

The evidence seized during the "inventory" search should be suppressed because
the inventory was a mere pretext for an investigatory search. The United States Supreme
Court established in South Dakota v. Opperman. 428 U.S. 364 (1976), that an
warrantless search in the context of impounding of a vehicle was lawful. However, the
inventory cannot be a mere "pretext concealing an investigatory police motive."
Opperman. 428 U.S. at 382-83. (Powell, J., concurring).
Subsequent Utah cases have fleshed out the perimeters of inventory searches.
The Utah Supreme Court has established that inventory searches can only be upheld if
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there is established reasonable procedure to do so, and that the search conforms to that
procedure. Hvgh. 711 at 269. In Hvgh. a Salt Lake City police ofiBcer searched a vehicle
after he had arrested the defendant for outstanding misdemeanor arrest warrants. Id. at
266. The officer did not request the permission of the owner, did not completely search
the vehicle and did not use a form to list the items in the automobile. Id. at 270. The
Utah Supreme Court held that given the officer's conduct, the search could not be
characterized as an inventory search.
Similarly, in Giron's case, Officer Bench did not discuss the search with Giron,
stopped his search once incriminating evidence was found and did not inventory any of
the property himself. An inventoiy list was not filled out until another officer
subsequently conducted a search of the car. Officer Bench's purpose appears to be
investigatory and not to protect Giron's personal property while the car was impounded.
In sum, the narcotics seized from Giron!s car should be suppressed in this case
because the inventory search made by Officer Bench was a mere pretext for an
investigatory search.
CONCLUSION
Defendant Giron urges this Court to suppress the evidence gathered during an
unlawful search of his automobile on January 22,1995. The impoundment of Giron's car
was improper as it was parked legally near his home. In addition, the inventory search of
Giron's vehicle was unlawful as it was a pretext for an investigatory search. Article I,
section 14 of the Utah State Constitution and the fourth amendment to the United
States Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. The warrantless search
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conducted by Officer Bench does not fit within any of the exceptions to the warrant
requirement. Given the unconstitutionality of the search, the evidence that was found
should be suppressed.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

SUPPLEMENT TO STATE'S
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS

-vsANGELORAYGIRON,

CaseNo.951900702FS

Defendant.

Hon. William B. Bohling

The State of Utah, by and through its counsel, E. Neal Gunnarson, Salt Lake District
Attorney, Richard Hamp, Deputy District Attorney, hereby submits this Supplemental
Memorandum.
FACTS
The officers had first encountered the Defendant and a passenger at approximately 8:00
PM when Defendant made two traffic violations which Officer Bench observed. (Reporter's
Transcript of Proceedings, Direct Examination of Officer Dale Bench, September 18, 1995, p. 5,
11. 11-15.) Officer Bench made a standard traffic stop. However, when the officers approached
Defendant's vehicle, the passenger leaped from the car and ran down the street, discarding a
package as he fled. (Direct Examination of Officer Bench, p. 6,1. 25; p. 7,11. 1-9.) After Officer
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Bench's partner, Officer Ruth, chased down the passenger, a physical altercation ensued between
Ruth and the passenger. Then suddenly people came piling out of a nearby home apparently to
rescue the passenger. At that point the situation became extremely tense. (Cross Examination of
Officer Bench, p. 31, U. 21-23.)
Officer Bench then ordered Defendant to stay at least once while he went to help his
partner. (Direct Examination of Officer Bench, p. 7, 11. 13-25; p. 8, U. 1-14.) Nevertheless,
Defendant sped off as soon as Officer Bench went to help Officer Ruth. (Direct Examination of
Officer Bench, p. 8, U. 1-5.)
After the officers settled the situation with Defendant's passenger, Mr. Zaragosa, they
used Defendant's identification to locate his home. (Direct Examination of Officer Bench, p. 8,11.
15-25; p. 9,11.1-4.) Meanwhile, they discovered that Defendant's license had expired. They went
to Defendant's home only to discover that no one was there. Finally, at 12:30 AM the officer
spotted Defendant and another passenger driving in the same car near Defendant's home. (Direct
Examination of Officer Bench, p. 9, 11. 22-25; p. 10, U. 1-8.) Even though they initiated their
emergency lights, Defendant continued to drive for another block before finally stopping. (Direct
Examination of Officer Bench, p. 10, U. 9-16.) The officers approached Defendant's car and
ordered him to get out of the vehicle. Defendant claimed the door was broken so the officers had
him climb out of the window. (Direct Examination of Officer Bench, p. 11, U. 1-19.) Officer
Bench immediately placed Defendant under arrest. (Direct Examination of Officer Bench, p. 11,11.
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20-23.) Officer Bench testified that he decided to impound the vehicle from the time he pulled
Defendant over. (Direct Examination of Officer Bench, p. 12, U. 1-8.) Officer Bench further
testified that it is his standard practice when he arrests a driver to ask passengers whether they
have a valid driver's license. (Cross Examination of Officer Bench, p. 36, U. 7-20.)
ANALYSIS
L DUAL BASES FOR REASONABLE AND PROPER
JUSTIFICATION FOR IMPOUND SEARCH
There are two bases under which an officer may impound a vehicle. First, an officer may
impound a vehicle if the officer has express statutory authority. See State v. Strickling, 844 P.2d
979, 986 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Second, an officer may impound a vehicle when circumstances
surrounding the initial stop reasonably justify the search. State v. Rice, 717 P.2d 695, 696 (Utah
1986). In the instant case, the officers did not have express statutory authority to impound the
vehicle. However, considering the totality of the surrounding circumstances, it was reasonable for
the officers to impound the vehicle. Furthermore, the impound was conducted pursuant to the
Salt Lake City Police Department policy.
Although the vehicle was not blocking traffic as in State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 452, 454
(Utah 1987), the seizure was reasonable due to the lateness of the hour and the Defendant's
behavior during the course of the evening. Salt Lake City Police Department policy does not
require officers exhaust all other alternatives before impounding. "The reasonableness of any
particular governmental activity does not necessarily or invariably turn on the existence of
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alternative 'less intrusive' means.*7 Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374, 107 S.Ct. 738, 742,
93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987) (quoting Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 2610,
77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983)).

Rather, the policy gives officers authority to

use alternatives to

impounding based on officer discretion. Moreover, there comes a point when economy of scale
for any particular law breaker necessitates stronger measures to insure officer and public safety.
Defendant did not obey the lawful order of Officer Bench to remain where he was. Indeed,
Defendant sped off. "Actually he squealed his tires as he left." (Direct Examination of Officer
Bench, p. 8,11. 4-5.) Then when confronted once again, this time in the middle of the night, the
Defendant did not immediately stop.

Due to this evasive and combative behavior it was

reasonable for the officers to immediately arrest Defendant, search his vehicle incident to his
arrest and then impound the vehicle. Therefore, based on the totality of the circumstances, the
impoundment of Defendant's vehicle was reasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.
H. REASONABLE AND PROPER IMPOUND WAS
NOT A PRETEXT FOR INVESTIGATORY SEARCH
The impound search in the instant case was not a pretext for further investigative
searching. The Utah Court of appeals stated in Slate v. Strickling:
[The officer's] subjective motivation in wanting to search defendant's vehicle for
evidence of burglary is essentially irrelevant. The determinative evidence here is
what the officer actually did, without regard to his motives in a particular case,
when confronted with registration violations. [The officer's] unrefuted testimony
is that he impounded the great majority of vehicles he stopped with expired
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registrations. Defendant made no showing that [the officer's] practice in this
regard was at odds with what reasonable officers customarily do.
844 P.2d 979, 987 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Similarly, in the instant case Officer Bench testified that he based the impound on "driver
arrest, no driver license, nobody to turn the vehicle over to." (Direct Examination of Officer
Bench, p. 12, 11. 5-6.) Further, he stated that this was consistent with Salt Lake City Police
Department policy and that his actions were pursuant to his usual practices. (Direct Examination
of Officer Bench, p. 12, 11. 7-9; p. 15, 11. 10-11.). Under the totality of the circumstances the
actions of Officer Bench were reasonable. Therefore, the impound inventory of Defendant's
property in his vehicle was not a pretext for further investigatory searching. Accordingly, the
inventory was reasonable and did not violate Defendant's Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
HI. SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST
Even assuming, arguendo, that there was not sufficient basis upon which to impound the
vehicle, the search was made incident to arrest and was therefore reasonable. See Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969).

"A contemporaneous,

warrantless search of the area within an arrestee's immediate control is permissible for the
purpose of recovering weapons the arrestee might reach, or to prevent concealment or destruction
of evidence." State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769,784 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The area of immediate
control includes the interior portion of a vehicle even when the arrestee is outside the vehicle.
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State, in re K.K.C., 636 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1981); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461,
101 S.Ct. 2860,2864,69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981); see also State v. Kent, 665 P.2d 1317,1318 (Utah
1983Xsearch of passenger area of car permissible where arrestee was handcuffed and lying on
ground next to car)..
In the instant case, the officer could reasonably justify the search on either prong. When
the officers stopped Defendant thefirsttime, the passenger leaped from the vehicle and ran down
the street, discarding a package of drugs.

Later after they found Defendant he did not

immediately stop. It was reasonable for the officers to conclude that Defendant and/or his
passenger may again attempt to conceal or destroy evidence of controlled substances.
Additionally, the police contact with Defendant and his passenger had been violent, and
Defendant had fled the scene of a traffic stop once. When the officers finally stopped Defendant
the second time it was dark, late and they Defendant had demonstrated a willingness to take
extreme measures from being stopped by the police. Therefore, it was reasonable for the officers
to search Defendant, and the area of his immediate control, including the interior of the vehicle for
weapons. Thus, Defendant was not subjected to an unreasonable search or seizure. Accordingly,
the Court should deny Defendant's Motion to Suppress.
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DATED this 19th day of October, 1995.
E. NEAL GUNNARSON
District Attorney
^

/

^

RICHARD HAMP
Deputy District Attorney
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CERTIFIC ATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Supplement To State's
Memorandum In Opposition To Defendant's Motion To Suppress was delivered to James C.
Bradshaw, Attorney for Defendant ANGELO RAY GIRON, at 10 West 300 South, Suite 500,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 on the 23

day of October, 1995.
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APPENDIX II
Salt Lake City Police Impound Policy
Inventory Form for Giron's Automobile

4-08-16,00

IMPOUNDS

4-08-16.01

Policy
Officers of this department may impound vehicles as a meansTS^Wflflffllng
local and state laws, removing a public hazard or nuisance, securing:
evidence, or protecting the vehicle and its contents until the owner can
take possession of if.
(Ref.: Title 41, Chapter 6, UCA)
To avoid needless expense and inconvenience to the vehicle owner, officers
shall use discretion in determining whether or not a vehicle should be
impounded.

Chinpd 9/8S

This department will provide the vehicle owner a NOTICE OF IMPOUNDMENT
within 48 hours of impoundment.
In the case of state impounds, the
Division of Motor Vehicles must be notified within 48 hours of impound.
The impounding officer must turn in the original copy of the STATE TAX
form with the impound report. Records will forward the form to the Auto
Theft Unit. Auto Theft personnel will notify the Motor Vehicle Division.
(For disposition of parking citation, see § 4-06-02.04C)

Added 8/90

When officers of this department impound a motor vehicle under city code,
a NOTICE OF IMPOUNDMENT AND RIGHT TO IMPOUND HEARING form will be
given to the owner of the vehicle. In the absence of the owner, the form
will be left with the driver. This form should NOT be used with state tax
impounds.

Added 7/31

The officer will fill in the name of the vehicle owner or driver from the
information obtained by valid identification. The most current address
should be obtained.

Added 7/9!

The officer will date and sign the form and deliver the original to the
vehicle owner or driver at the time of the impound. The copy of the
NOTICE OF IMPOUNDMENT AND RIGHT TO IMPOUND HEARING form should be
turned in with the initial report to Records Bureau who will forward it
with the case to Auto Theft.

Added 7/9!

The initial officer should deliver the original copy of the form to the
vehicle's registered owner or driver during the course of the investigation
(such as at the hospital or the jail).

Added 7/91

If the vehicle's owner or driver has left the sc^ne prior to the impound,
the original copy should be left in a visible and "safe place in the vehicle's
driver compartment. The officer should write "Unavailable to Sign" in the
"Deliver To" area. The copy should then be forwarded as above.

4-08-16.02 Authority of Parking Enforcement Personnel
Changed 7/S1

Parking enforcement personnel are authorized to impound vehicles that are
parked in violation of city ordinances and state laws. Upon request, an
officer of this department will respond and provide assistance as needed.
Such impounds will be coordinated through the police dispatcher and
appropriate reports and documentation will be maintained by this
department.

Added 7/91

D u r i n g a c i t y i m p o u n d , t h e s a m e NOTICE OF IMPOUNDMENT AND NOTICE OF
RIGHT TO IMPOUND HEARING f o r m will b e u s e d b y p a r k i n g e n f o r c e m e n t

Dersonnel in the same manner as prescribed above for police personnel.

Only those towing companies specified by contractual agreement with the
city will be used to tow impounded vehicles.
JPwgeo 9/84

There are several impound lots used to store impounded vehicles. The
reporting officer must determine the destination of the impounded vehicle
and put the address of the impound lot in the VEHICLE FIELD on the
impound report.

4-08-16.04 Holds and Vehicle Inventory
A.

Holds on Impounded Vehicles
At the time of impound, .the officer must notify the dispatcher of any
holds on the impounded vehicle. Records personnel will refer to this
information when a vehicle owner or the owner's representative
inquires about release of the vehicle.

Chrgec 1/ii

1.

Hold for owner - The vehicle may be released to the owner or
the owner's representative.

2.

Hold for State - Release of the vehicle must be obtained
through the State Division of Motor Vehicles.

3.

Hold for Recovered Stolen - Release of the vehicle must be
obtained through the Auto Theft Unit.

4.

Hold for evidence - The vehicle can only be released upon
authorization of the investigating division or the County
Attorney's Office.

C^ged 5/89

If a car is impounded as a recovered stolen vehicle, the car shall be
removed to the CITY IMPOUND LOT and "HELD FOR OWNER". Should
the vehicle be improperly registered, evidence in another case,
ownership in dispute, etc., a hold should be placed for the follow-up
unit. (Any vehicle which would have been released to the owner at
the scene can be f,HELD FOR OWNER", when impounded.)
(See § 4-08-03.03)

Chrged 5/89

When a vehicle is impounded with a hold for evidence, the hold will
expire seven days from the date of impoundment. If circumstances
require the hold to be extended past the sev^n-day period, follow-u^
investigators must submit a written requesj through their division
commander advising the impound coordinator of the extension. The
extended hold will be removed by the follow-up officer as soon as
possible.
B.

Vehicle Inventory
A thorough inventory search will be made of all vehicles being
impounded (ref. § 4-04-03.05). A thorough inventory search will
include:

Accsd 9/88

1*

The interior of the vehicle, including under the seats, the glovs
box, etc.

2.

Under the hood
Sepnnttd 7/'8/91

Added 6/89

3.

The trunk, when possible

4.

All closed containers, including sacks, bags, boxes, etc.

The officer will remove all valuables from the vehicle and place them
in evidence for safekeeping.
Changed 6/89

Closed or locked briefcases, luggage, etc., will be opened before
being placed in evidence. Such items will be opened in the presence
of a supervisor if the locks must be forced or other damage done in
order to open them. It is recommended the vehicle's owner or driver
be present.
All items not considered valuables, such as spare tires, old clothing,
etc., will be locked in the vehicle's trunk, if possible.
The officer will include in the initial report:
1.

Valuables placed into evidence

2.

Valuable items left in the vehicle because of the difficulty of
transporting them to evidence (large machinery, etc.) will be
listed in the report's details.

3.

If no valuables are found in the vehicle, the officer will note
that information in the report's details.

4-08-16.05 Releasing Vehicles to Incompetent Drivers
Chained 6/89

The city assumes control of, and responsibility for, vehicles once they are
impounded. In order to comply with the department's obligations under
the law and to avoid liability for any damage or injury resulting from the
release of an impounded vehicle to an intoxicated or otherwise
incapacitated person, the vehicle owner's condition must be assessed
before the vehicle is released.
(Ref.: 12.24.060 SLC Code)
If a vehicle owner requests release of an impounded vehicle and appears
to be intoxicated or otherwise incapable of operating the vehicle safely,
records personnel will request that an officer be dispatched to the desk.
The assigned officer will evaluate the owner's condition and take
appropriate action.
If the owner proves to be intoxicated or unable to operate a vehicle
safely, the vehicle will not be released. If the owner is incapacitated, but
requests that the vehicle be released to another person, and the officer
is satisfied that the person could legally operate the vehicle, the officer
may authorize release of the vehicle.

4-08-16.06

Access to the City Impound Lot
This policy serves to limit access to impounded vehicles in storage at the
city impound lot in order to establish accountability for property removed
from impounded vehicles. No one, including police officers, will be allowed
access to the impound lot without complying with procedures outlined in
this order.

Added 1/86

Impound lots under state control are not governed by this policy.
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FILES BfSTE'a**
" • • » * » » » « » *.*.*..».

Third Judiciai District

JAN 2 6 1996

JAMES C BRADSHAW, Esq., No. 3768
Attorney for Defendant
10 West 300 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-2114

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

]i
>
]

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT
and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

]

ANGELO R. GIRON,
Defendant

i

Case No. 951900702FS

>

Judge Bohling

The above-entitled manner came on for hearing on the 30th day of October, 1995.
The State was present and represented by its counsel, Richard Ramp and Fred
Burmester. The Defendant was present and represented by his counsel James C.
Bradshaw. The Court having received the States Memorandum and Supplemental
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress and having received
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress, and having heard the
testimony presented at the hearing of September 18,1995, and further having heard the
arguments of counsel on October 30,1995, and being otherwise advised in the matter
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issues of the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. That on January 22,1995, Salt Lake City Police Officer, D. Bench, stopped the
vehicle of Defendant Angelo Giron, based on Mr. Giron's commission of traffic
violations and other criminal offenses committed in the officers presence.
2. Mr. Giron's vehicle at the time of his detention and arrest was lawfully parked
directly across from hi? residence.
3. After stopping the vehicle, Officer Bench immediately placed Mr. Giron under
arrest, handcuffed Mr. Giron, and placed Mr. Giron into Officer Bench's vehicle.
4. After placing Mr. Giron under arrest and placing Mr. Giron in his vehicle,
Officer Bench requested and obtained registration information relevant to Mr. Giron!s
vehicle which indicated that the vehicle was lawfully registered and licensed.
5. Subsequent to obtaining the registration information, Officer Bench initiated a
search of Defendant's car which revealed controlled substances.
6. No controlled substances were in plain view of the officer.
7. That at the time he conducted a search of Mr. Giron's vehicle, Officer Bench
expressly justified the search as an inventory, which he stated was necessary as a result of
a need to impound Mr. Giron's vehicle.
8. That Officer Bench never asked the Defendant if his passenger could accept
custody of the vehicle, if there was someone in his home that could accept custody of the
2
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vehicle, and never inquired of Mr. Giron's passenger if he'd be willing to take custody of
the vehicle.
9. The reported inventory search conducted when Officer Bench in this case was
carried out in a manner contrary to established Salt Lake City Police Procedures for an
inventory search in the following particulars:
(a) Inventory forms were not used.
(b) No written list of items found was made.
(c) There was no attempt to contemporaneously record what was found
where.
(d) There was no attempt to involve Mr. Giron, his passenger, or others at
Mr. Giron's residence in the decisions of impound.
10. Although Officer Bench articulated that his purpose in searching Mr. Gironfs
car was to inventoiy the items in the vehicle, his actions in searching the vehicle, his
testimony, and his demeanor upon the witness stand indicate that the search was
conducted for an investigatory police purpose.
11. At the time Officer Bench searched Mr. Giron's car, aoy possibility of Mr.
Giron gaining access to the car for purposes of recovering a weapon, or concealing or
destroying evidence had been completely eliminated by the arrest, handcuffing, and the
removal of the Defendant from the area of the vehicle.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court issues the following:
3
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. That as a result the Defendant's vehicle being parked directly across from his
residence, impoundment was neither authorized nor necessary.
2. Even assuming arguendo the impound was justified, the "inventory" search was
merely a pretext for an investigatory search for evidence.
3. That at the time of the search the Defendant had been secured and removed
from the area, that there was no physical or temporal proximity to the arrest, and no
basis to justify the search of Defendant's vehicle as a search incident to his arrest.
4. The search of Defendant's vehicle cannot be justified under any exceptions to
the warrant requirements of the Utah State and United States Constitution. Therefore,
evidence discovered in the Defendant's vehicle must be suppressed as violative of
Defendant's right to be free from illegal searches and seizures as guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment by the United States Constitution, and by our Article 1, Section 14
of the Utah State Constitution.

DATED this

day of January, 1996.

c Ji;j^ih
HONORABLE WILLIAM B. BOHLlftG
J
Third District Court Jtidge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the fu^

day of January, 1996,1 mailed the

foregoing Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress, postage prepaid,
to:
Richard G. Hamp
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

r

bM»L) 1LAAA«

oooos<-

